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Viễn ảnh Việt Nam 2010. Trích từ Country Report – Vietnam, của Economist Intelligence Unit
Economist Ingtelligence Unit – Country Report: Vietnam
Outlook for 2010
• The ruling Communist Party of Vietnam is due to hold its next national congress in 2011. As a result, there will be considerable jockeying for position within the current leadership from mid-2010.
• The budget deficit (excluding on-lending) will remain wide in 2010-11. The government!s revenue position will improve in the next two years, but expenditure will remain relatively high.
• The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV, the central bank) is likely to continue to tighten monetary policy in 2010-11 as inflationary pressures build.
• The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that the pace of economic growth will accelerate in 2010-11, but we do not expect it to return to the heady rates that were recorded in the years preceding the 2008-09 slowdown.
• Although the SBV will take steps to rein in credit growth in 2010, inflation will accelerate to an average rate of 10.1% in 2010-11.
• On an annual average basis, we forecast that the dong will depreciate against the US dollar by 5% in 2010 and by 1.7% in 2011, although there are significant downside risks to this forecast.
• We expect the current-account deficit to remain wide in 2010-11, standing at an annual average of around 10.1% of GDP.
The ruling Communist Party of Vietnam is facing a number of major challenges in the run-up to the next national congress, which is due in January 2011. In the months leading up to the congress, there will be considerable jockeying for position within the current leadership, although it will be largely invisible from outside of the party. There could be important changes in personnel in the higher echelons of the party, but its central tenets will remain unchanged and its overriding objective will be to maintain its position of dominance.
However, factional splits in the party are becoming increasingly apparent. Such divisions tend to be between reformists and conservatives, but recent jostling suggests that the divide is no longer as clear-cut and that internal wrangling is now more related to attempts to grab power than to policy differences.
Nevertheless, it appears that the prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, and his reformist allies, including two deputy prime ministers, Hoang Trung Hai and Nguyen Thien Nhan, could be eclipsed by those in the party with conservative tendencies. Any such differences would be evident in matters relating to economic policy, media freedom and foreign relations. Those lining up against Mr Dung include the general secretary of the party, Nong Duc Manh, the public security minister, Le Hong Anh, the party!s head of personnel and organisation, Ho Duc Viet, and the head of the party secretariat, Truong Tan Sang.
The partys success in promoting economic growth, even in the global economic downturn, has both contributed to a sense of political apathy and strengthened the partys long-standing claim to the right to govern the country unchallenged. However, its legitimacy and its defence of the virtues of the oneparty state could yet be questioned amid economic uncertainty, endemic corruption, environmental degradation and strongly felt grievances relating to land seizures. Reflecting such threats, the leadership will remain anxious about the activities of political dissidents, and will therefore not hesitate to suppress opposition activism. Vocal opponents of the regime who advocate multiparty politics and genuine democratic reform will continue to be punished and imprisoned.
There may be attempts by the party to demonstrate a degree of political openness, together with limited “grass-roots democracy” at provincial, district and commune levels. However, hardliners within the party are growing increasingly fearful that greater social freedoms will threaten the party!s hold on power. This is particularly apparent in the area of media freedom. Although the ongoing crackdown on corrupt officials and managers of state-owned enterprises is an indication that the government is taking the issue of graft
seriously, recent steps to tighten control over the flow of news via print media and the Internet suggest that party leaders remain determined not to allow the true extent of corruption to be revealed or to allow dissenting opinions to be aired publicly.
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