Chinese flags flutter above streets and red celebratory banners line the harbor front, as a beaming crowd of masked officials and school children wave and chant in unison inside Hong Kong’s high-speed rail terminus, welcoming the arrival of Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Được đầu tư vốn lớn cùng làn đường riêng, tuyến BRT đầu tiên của Hà Nội chưa thu hút được người dân, không giảm ùn tắc và thúc đẩy giao thông công cộng.
Tuyến BRT Kim Mã – Yên Nghĩa được phê duyệt từ năm 2007 với tổng vốn đầu tư khoảng 55 triệu USD, tương đương 1.100 tỷ đồng. Ngày 1/1/2017, tuyến bắt đầu hoạt động theo lộ trình Yên Nghĩa – Ba La – Lê Trọng Tấn – Tố Hữu – Lê Văn Lương – Láng Hạ – Giảng Võ – bến xe Kim Mã. Người dân di chuyển toàn tuyến dài 14,77 km sẽ mất khoảng 45 phút.
Dự án được thực hiện bằng vốn vay của Ngân hàng Thế giới (WB). Đây là hợp phần trong lộ trình dài hơi phát triển giao thông công cộng Hà Nội mà WB tham gia. Cơ quan này đưa ra nhiều mục tiêu khi xây dựng tuyến buýt nhanh, như cải thiện tình trạng ùn tắc, ô nhiễm; làm nền tảng phát triển hạ tầng giao thông công cộng; thúc đẩy người dân chuyển từ xe cá nhân sang phương tiện công cộng.
Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister says the island nation’s debt-laden economy has “collapsed” as it runs out of money to pay for food and fuel.
Short of cash to pay for imports of such necessities and already defaulting on its debt, the country is seeking help from neighbouring India and China and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Andrew MullenDeputy Editor, Political Economy 25 June 2022
Dear Global Impact Readers,
Space, they say, is the final frontier. But how far does that frontier go and what’s out there?
China, has in recent years, accelerated all things space as part of its busy science programme we recapped a few weeks ago, from landing a rover on Mars to nearing completion of its Tiangong space station.
The Quadrilateral grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the Quad) has come a long way from its origins, establishing itself as a crucial pillar of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture and significantly shifting in tone and focus from its early iterations. Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has been elevated to a leader-level dialogue, it has begun issuing joint statements, and it has developed a new working-group structure to facilitate cooperation. It has also significantly broadened and deepened its agenda to include vaccines, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, cyber, and space.
These recent changes to the Quad raise several questions about its future trajectory. What are the drivers of engagement, the domestic support, and the bureaucratic capacity in the four countries to continue investing in the Quad? How well does the Quad’s new working-group structure function, and will the working groups be able to deliver tangible results? How has the Quad’s agenda evolved, and will it return to its initial focus on security challenges? Are the Quad countries open to cooperation with additional countries and, if so, what form will this take?
This paper analyzes these questions drawing on recent publications, official statements, and interviews with key experts and policymakers in the four countries. In doing so, it offers five key takeaways into the Quad as an evolving part of the Indo-Pacific architecture, as well as a vehicle for achieving the goals of its four member countries.
Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has been elevated to a leader-level dialogue, it has begun issuing joint statements, and it has developed a new working-group structure to facilitate cooperation
First, in terms of institutionalization and internal goals, there is little interest among the member countries in further institutionalizing the Quad by establishing a secretariat or adopting a charter. All four consider the flexible nature of the grouping to be an asset. At the same time, the Quad partners have increased their alignment on strategic issues and aim to continue doing so in the near future by solidifying ties within the grouping.
Demonstrators carry pictures of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, during a protest in Karachi on Dec. 24, 2019. RIZWAN TABASSUM/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
This week brought news that the health of two former South Asian leaders has taken a turn for the worse. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who ruled the country as a military dictator for nearly a decade in the 2000s, is hospitalized with a rare and incurable disease that causes organ damage. In Bangladesh, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who served two separate terms, had a heart attack.
That many South Asian leaders have reached old age speaks to the relative improvement in the region’s political stability, after decades when executions by coup or assassinations were not uncommon in some countries. Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif have each recently experienced health issues. India lost one former prime minister in 2018, and Pakistan has lost two formerleaders since 2020.
Chien-pin Li is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Sam Houston State University. Before his current position, he taught at Kennesaw State University for 26 years, and was a founding member of the China Research Center. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Iowa and was an Associate Research Fellow at Academia Sinica (Taipei, Taiwan), a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States (Washington, D.C.) and a Research Fellow at the Pacific Cultural Foundation (Taipei, Taiwan). His teaching and research interests focus on East Asian political economy, including trade disputes, trade negotiations, and regional integration. He is the author of Rising East Asia: The Quest for Governance, Prosperity, and Security (2020) and has published articles in Asian Survey, Pacific Review, Issues & Studies, International Studies Quarterly, and other journals.
The security and economic landscape in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly difficult to navigate. While trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership signal an interest to cooperate in a region full of economic vibrancy, competition and rivalry between great powers cast significant uncertainty over the peace and stability in the region. The paradoxical trends in economic and security affairs are particularly evident in cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China.
Captain Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, U.S. Navy (Ret.), is the Howard S. Levie Chair on the Law of Armed Conflict and Professor of International Law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College. He was a Peer Reviewer for the International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary of 2017 on the Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members Of the Armed Forces at Sea (1949) and is currently one of two U.S. representative to the International Group of Experts for the San Remo Manual on the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, produced by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. Prior to his retirement from the Navy he served as the senior legal advisor to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and was a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Pedrozo is co-author of the forthcoming, “Emerging Technology and the Law of the Sea” (Oxford University Press).
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On Sept. 18 and 19, People’s Liberation Army combat aircraft on 40 occasions intentionally crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait that separates mainland China from the island of Taiwan. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen immediately condemned the provocation as a “threat of force.”
The center line in the Taiwan Strait (also known as the median line, middle line or Davis Line, named after Brig. Gen. Benjamin Davis, commander of Task Force 13 in Taipei and famed commander of the World War II Tuskegee Airmen) has its origins in the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty was one link in the chain of U.S. collective defense arrangements in the Western Pacific—which included agreements with the Republic of the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea—designed to resist further communist subversive activities directed against their territorial integrity and political stability. Pursuant to Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty, an armed attack in the treaty area, which included Taiwan and the Pescadores (or Penghu) Islands, directed against the territory of either party would be considered a danger “to its own peace and safety” and each party “would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” An addendum to the treaty established a buffer zone into which U.S. aircraft were not allowed to enter.
Responding to widespread criticism of the Biden administration’s paltry offer of funding for Southeast Asian partners at a recent summit, a wise friend offered a colorful metaphor: “If we’re dating and I sense that you’re being transactional, then I want you to take me to the best restaurant in town and get the priciest bottle of wine. If you want a long-term relationship, buy me a cheap bottle of Chianti and we can sit on the roof and watch the sunset.”
My friend is right: no amount of money will win hearts and minds in the vital Indo-Pacific region unless it comes with a credible demonstration of long-term commitment to the region.
The Joe Biden administration has unveiled its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, but it doesn’t look like a traditional trade deal and could end up falling short of its ambitions.
From left to right, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, U.S. President Joe Biden, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) launch event in Tokyo in May 2022. Jonathan Ernst/Reuters
In late May, the Joe Biden administration launched its first major trade initiative: the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The IPEF is billed as an effort to expand U.S. economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region. This was also the objective of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal that was negotiated during the Barack Obama administration. But President Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP in 2017, and the Biden administration has made clear that it does not intend to reenter that trade pact, which is now renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP.
June 4, the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre—in which People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces killed hundreds and perhaps thousands of protesters as well as crushing demonstrations across the country—is a fraught moment in China. In Hong Kong, the public once freely memorialized the massacre. This year, authorities again used the national security law passed in 2020 to block gatherings; six people were arrested.
In mainland China, the anniversary claimed an unexpected victim: e-commerce influencer Li Jiaqi, widely known as the “Lipstick Brother” or “Lipstick King.” During a livestream on June 3, Li was presented with a cake that resembled a tank. Censors promptly pulled the show offline, and it hasn’t returned, with Li’s team citing “technical difficulties.” Early June is a prime time for online shopping ahead of June 18, China’s second-biggest day for online sales. But Li’s name now returns blank results on search platforms, even on e-commerce sites.
If there was one common challenge to unite the Asia Pacific region, it would be corruption. From campaign pledges to media coverage to civil society forums, corruption dominates discussion. Yet despite all this talk, there’s little sign of action. Between Australia’s slipping scores and North Korea’s predictably disastrous performance, the 2015 index shows no significant improvement. Has Asia Pacific stalled in its efforts to fight corruption?
This year’s poor results demand that leaders revisit the genuineness of their efforts and propel the region beyond stagnation.
The public desire for change is huge. In India, Sri Lanka and elsewhere, we’ve seen a host of governments coming to power on anti-corruption platforms. As corruption continues to dominate media coverage across and beyond the region, increasing interest in the issue has sparked a raft of new research into both public and private sector corruption.
The bad
So why this picture of zero progress? Despite boastful efforts on petty corruption, Malaysia’s 1MBD scandal brought the crux of the challenge into sharp focus: is political leadership genuinely committed to fighting corruption throughout society? The Malaysian prime minister’s inability to answer questions on the US$700 million that made its way into his personal bank account is only the tip of the iceberg.
In India and Sri Lanka leaders are falling short of their bold promises, while governments in Bangladesh and Cambodia are exacerbating corruption by clamping down on civil society. In Afghanistan and Pakistan a failure to tackle corruption is feeding ongoing vicious conflicts, while China’s prosecutorial approach isn’t bringing sustainable remedy to the menace. This inability to tackle root causes holds true across the region – witness, for example, Australia’s dwindling score in recent years.
Malaysia’s 1MBD scandal brought the challenge into sharp focus: is political leadership genuinely committed to fighting corruption throughout society?
Reversing corruption is clearly not solely down to governments, but they’re the ones with the largest role and the power to create enabling environments for others. This year’s poor results demand that leaders revisit the genuineness of their efforts and propel the region beyond stagnation. They must fulfil promises, and ensure efforts aren’t undermined in practice. Anti-corruption commissions are a prime example here: while their creation across the region is commendable, ongoing political interference and inadequate resources has meant many are unable to fulfil their mandate. This has to be addressed.
Across Asia, the use of personal connections to get ahead is a common practice.
In addition to paying bribes for the services they need, people use their family or social contacts to skip the line or gain quicker and better access to schools and hospitals, and “speed up” government paperwork such as driver’s licenses or birth certificates..
How much you can increase the speed and quality of your service often depends on how much you can pay or who you know.
In the Global Corruption Barometer — Asia, we asked people about how and why they paid bribes or used personal connections when accessing public services across Asia.
Hannah J. Dawson, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand
Disclosure statement
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Republish our articles for free, online or in print, under Creative Commons licence.
Technological innovation can indeed be beneficial for the working class. Photo by JNS/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images
Narrative frames are fundamental to unifying ideologies. They frame what is possible and impossible, which ideas can be accepted and which must be rejected. In her book, Digital Democracy, Analogue Politics, storyteller and political analyst Nanjala Nyabola examines the framing of the Fourth Industrial Revolution narrative in this light.
Rising prices are hurting wallets across the world. The crisis is particularly bad in Sri Lanka and Turkey, and in Japan, people are facing inflation for the first time in decades.
Nikkei staff writersMay 20, 2022 07:38 JST
NEW YORK — Welcome to Nikkei Asia’s podcast: Asia Stream.
Every episode, Asia Stream tracks and analyzes the Indo-Pacific with a mix of expert interviews and original reporting by our correspondents from across the globe.
Andrew MullenDeputy Editor, Political Economy 25 June 2022
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