Seven years have passed since the July 2016 South China Sea arbitral ruling was issued. Through 2022, most countries’ positions on the arbitration had remained the same as their initial positions taken in the weeks following the ruling. But in the last year, amid renewed concern for international rules and norms in the wake of the war in Ukraine and with a more active Philippine policy on the South China Sea, numerous countries have voiced their support for the ruling as legally binding.
Rafting is the tactic of tying ships at anchor together to establish a semi-persistent floating outpost that is hard to uproot.
Gaute Friis | JULY 16, 2023
Rows of PAFMM trawlers rafting near Whitsun Reef, March 25, 2021 (Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Maxar Technologies)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
“Rafting” refers to the gray zone tactic of tying ships together at anchor to establish semi-persistent floating outposts that are difficult disperse due to their collective mass.
The ships are generally the component of China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) known as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV). According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s detailed report on the PAFMM, these SBFVs receive generous government subsidies to remain at sea for most of the year, specifically to assert Beijing’s expansive maritime claims.
This tactic describes maneuvering one’s ship dangerously across the bow of another, often forcing the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision.
Gaute Friis | JULY 18, 2023 Sealight 333
PLAN Destroyer Lanzhou, at right, is seen here sailing within 40 meters of the USS Decatur, to the left (Source: USN)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Bow-crossing describes a harassment tactic in which a ship abruptly maneuvers to cross dangerously across the bow of another in violation of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) and the 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
This maneuver is intended to force the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision. It may be used to disrupt freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) or other assertions of international law or national sovereignty.
A recent example was documented in June 2023, when a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel crossed dangerously in front of U.S. Navy destroyer USS Chung-Hoon during a joint Taiwan Strait passage with the Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal, forcing the U.S. ship to reduce speed to avoid a collision:
China’s ships use bow-crossing to protest the activities of other countries’ ships in waters over which it claims sovereignty or jurisdiction, and to send the message that Beijing is willing to escalate tensions in defense of its claims.
In nautical terms, it involves a closest point of approach (CPA) of less than 2 lengths of the ship being intercepted. They are usually referred to by the U.S. Navy as “unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers”.
Other examples:
On September 30, 2018, the PLAN Type 052C Luyang II-class destroyer Lanzhou intercepted the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Decatur, which was conducting a FONOP with 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied artificial islands in the South China Sea. The picture at the top of this post shows how close the two ships came to colliding.
On June 21, 2014, CCG vessel Haijian 2168 approached Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) ship CSB 4032 at high speed. The VCG ship had to change directions repeatedly to avoid a collision as the distance between the two ships came within 30 meters.
On December 5, 2013, a Chinese warship cut across the bow of the missile cruiser U.S.S. Cowpens at a distance of less than 200 yards in international waters.
In March 2009, five Chinese ships (a combination of PLAN, CCG and militia) harassed the U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable in international waters in the South China Sea, forcing the American ship to make an emergency maneuver to avoid a collision.
Editor’s note: This post was originally published on 7 July under the title “Unsafe Maneuvers”, but was retracted when we decided to divide it into two separate categories. Apologies for any confusion.
Gaute Friis
Gaute is a Defense Innovation Scholar at Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National Sec
CCG 5201 blocks the path of BRP Malapascua, forcing it to abort its planned patrol of the Second Thomas Shoal after a 30 minute stand-off, April 26, 2023 (Source: BBC)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Blocking is a form of bow-crossing meant to physically impede the passage of another ship to its destination. Blocking is typically used by Chinese ships to hinder other countries from resupplying or reinforcing their outposts in the South China Sea.
Distinct from other forms of bow-crossing, blocking is used for area denial rather than operations disruption and will often result in more protracted stand-offs. China uses this tactic to assert its claims of jurisdiction as well as to prevent certain activities–most notably the reinforcement of other claimants’ existing Spratly Island outposts.
One such blocking maneuver occurred on April 26th, 2023, when China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 5201 blocked the path of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol vessel BRP Malapascua. This forced the much smaller PCG ship to abort its planned route to the entrance of Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal during a resupply mission to the Philippines’ outpost aboard BRP Sierra Madre:
China routinely prevents the entry of Philippine ships into the interior of Second Thomas Shoal as a cornerstone of its strategy to prevent the rusting outpost from being repaired or replaced until it breaks up or otherwise becomes uninhabitable. For nearly a decade it has allowed only small wooden boats carrying food and replacement troops to pass through its blockade.
Resupply boat brings food and replacement troops to the Philippine Navy’s outpost aboard BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal, 21 June 2022. Credit: Inquirer/ Marianne Bermudez
Other examples:
On September 19, 2019, also near Second Thomas Shoal, a CCG ship blocked Philippine civilian vessels while they were conducting a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre.
On November 13, 2015, about 13 nautical miles from Subi Reef, CCG cutters 35115 and 2305 blocked the path of a Vietnamese replenishment ship heading towards the Vietnamese outpost on Southwest Cay, forcing the ship to find a different route to its destination. PLA Navy Type 072A landing ship 995 later blocked the ship’s path again, this time brandishing small arms and firing a warning shot.
Swarming is a commonly used tactic involving dispatching a flotilla to overwhelm and intimidate other actors, assert dominance, or provide a security screen for certain Chinese ships on special missions.
Chinese fishing vessels head out to sea from Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province, China. (Source: China Foto Press)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Swarming is a commonly used tactic involving dispatching a flotilla (often a combination of militia, coast guard, and sometimes navy vessels) to overwhelm and intimidate other countries’ assets, assert dominance, or provide a security screen for certain Chinese ships on special missions.
Examples:
Starting on May 7, 2023, Chinese survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 10 and a flotilla of escort vessels consisting of China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels spent nearly a month conducting survey operations deep within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These activities led to a formal protest from the Vietnamese government.
On March 4, 2023, one People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, one CCG ship and 42 PAFMM vessels gathered near Thitu Island. Thitu Island (also known as Pag-Asa) is home to one of the Philippines’ most important military outposts in the West Philippine Sea, as well as a small civilian population.
On July 22, 2014, a Vietnamese fishing boat was surrounded by Chinese vessels 5 nautical miles South of Collins Reef. Chinese coast guard ships then rammed the fishing boat, which nearly sank.
On June 29, 2014, 45 nautical miles to the southwest of Paracel Islands, about 34 Chinese fishing vessels, supported by 2 coast guard ships, closely followed, obstructed and intimidated Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the area.
Sealight 333 Episode 1 – Phlippines v. China – The 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award
None of the Reefs or Rocks in the Spratly Islands Are Big Enough to Generate Their Own EEZ
SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way.
Ray Powell | JULY 11, 2023
Ray Powell
Team Member
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SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way.
Our first video explains the meaning of the 2016 Aribitral Tribunal case, Philippines v. China, and why the Philippines’ victory was so important infirmly establishing how China’s expansive nine-dash line claim–and the aggressive methods it uses to enforce it–systematically violate the rights of the Philippines and all its smaller neighbors.
Ray Powell
Ray is the Director of SeaLight and Project Lead for Project Myoushu at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. He’s a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force and was a 2021 Fellow at Stanford’s Distinguished Careers Institute.
In May, the Philippines and China took turns installing buoys in the disputed Spratly Islands. The deployment of buoys and other sovereignty markers in the South China Sea has a long history. But amid a flurry of new activity by the Philippines, including publicized patrols and surveillance missions, it is noteworthy that the buoy deployment triggered an almost immediate reaction from China, which installed its own. And with the Philippines planning to install more buoys by the end of 2023, this trend will remain a point of contention between Manila and Beijing for the foreseeable future.
On May 15, the Philippine Coast Guard installed 30-foot navigational buoys at five features in the Spratly Islands: Philippine-occupied Flat Island, Loaita Island, and Loaita Cay, and unoccupied Irving Reef and Whitsun Reef. The buoys are of the same type as five installed in May of 2022 at four Philippine-occupied features: Nanshan Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, and Thitu Island.
July 11, 2023 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada
Global Affairs Canada today issued the following statement:
“On the anniversary of the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the matter of the South China Sea, Canada reiterates that this decision is final, binding on the parties, and provides a vital foundation for the peaceful resolution of competing maritime claims in the region, consistent with international law.
In May, the Philippines and China took turns installing buoys in the disputed Spratly Islands. The deployment of buoys and other sovereignty markers in the South China Sea has a long history. But amid a flurry of new activity by the Philippines, including publicized patrols and surveillance missions, it is noteworthy that the buoy deployment triggered an almost immediate reaction from China, which installed its own. And with the Philippines planning to install more buoys by the end of 2023, this trend will remain a point of contention between Manila and Beijing for the foreseeable future. Continue reading Buoy battle in the Spratly islands→
On July 12 an arbitral tribunal issued a long-awaited ruling in Manila’s case against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. How did the judges rule and how does the area of the South China Sea they found to be legally disputed compare to China’s infamous nine-dash line claim?
The tribunal invalidated Beijing’s claims to ill-defined historic rights throughout the nine-dash line, found that Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and surprised many observers by ruling on the legal status of every feature in the Spratly Islands raised by the Philippines. It found that none of the Spratlys, including the largest natural features—Itu Aba, Thitu Island, Spratly Island, Northeast Cay, and Southwest Cay—are legally islands because they cannot sustain a stable human community or independent economic life. As such, they are entitled only to territorial seas, not EEZs or continental shelves. Of the seven Spratlys occupied by China, the court ruled that Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Gaven Reef are rocks, while Hughes Reef and Mischief Reef are below water at high-tide and therefore generate no maritime entitlements of their own. It also ruled that Kennan Reef is a low-tide elevation, while Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged and belong to the Philippine continental shelf. Taken together, these decisions effectively invalidate any Chinese claim within the nine-dash line to more than the disputed islets themselves and the territorial seas they generate.
Thỏa thuận an ninh ký với Papua New Guinea và Philippines giúp Mỹ hoàn thiện bố phòng quân sự, ngăn ảnh hưởng của Trung Quốc tại khu vực.
Thỏa thuận Hợp tác Quốc phòng (DCA) được Mỹ ký với Papua New Guinea hồi tháng 5 sẽ cho phép quân đội Mỹ toàn quyền tiếp cận mọi cảng biển cùng sân bay tại quốc gia có diện tích lớn nhất và đông dân nhất trong nhóm các đảo quốc Thái Bình Dương.
Vị trí chuỗi đảo thứ nhất và chuỗi đảo thứ hai. Đồ họa: Cofda
Giới quan sát đánh giá thỏa thuận này là một động thái lớn, giúp Mỹ cải thiện đáng kể khả năng hỗ trợ các căn cứ quân sự trên đảo Guam, đồng thời ngăn chặn ảnh hưởng ngày càng tăng của Trung Quốc ở khu vực nam Thái Bình Dương.
Đêm 10 rạng sáng 11/6 đã xảy ra hai vụ tấn công vào trụ sở ủy ban hai xã ở huyện Cư Kuin tỉnh Đắk Lắk khiến một số cán bộ và người dân thiệt mạng và bị thương. Đằng sau vụ việc này có thể là tổ chức nào và nhằm mục đích gì?
The coast guards of the Philippines, US and Japan are holding their first ever joint exercises.
They’re taking place as tensions are rising in the Indo-Pacific region.
Al Jazeera’s Barnaby Lo reports from the South China Sea.
Đọt Chuối Non 