The United States has denied Chinese claims that a US destroyer was driven out from waters around the contested Paracel Islands after it “illegally” entered the area.
China’s state media described the US ship as having trespassed in “Chinese territorial waters”.
The US Navy on Thursday disputed the PLA statement, saying the destroyer was conducting “routine operations” in the South China Sea and was not expelled by Chinese ships.
Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu joins us live from Beijing to give us the latest updates.
China’s military, law enforcement, and militia engaged in regular standoffs between 2018 and 2021 with Southeast Asian neighbors over oil and gas exploration inside Beijing’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. By contrast, 2022 was comparatively quiet when it came to tensions over hydrocarbons, aside from one encounter involving the Philippines. But as several claimants forge ahead with new offshore projects in 2023, oil and gas development could reemerge as a primary flashpoint in the disputes.
This feature details new exploration and development projects by claimants across the South China Sea. Many of the new projects lie in disputed waters, some at the sites of previous confrontations. With the China Coast Guard increasing the frequency of patrols across disputed waters, the prospect of confrontation between Chinese law enforcement and oil and gas operators at many of these locations is high.All of the projects detailed here and more are available to explore on AMTI’s newly updated map of Energy Exploration and Development in the South China Sea.
MANILA – The Philippines has filed 10 diplomatic protests against China over alleged “violations” in the South China Sea barely two months into 2023, underscoring renewed tensions between the two nations over the disputed waters.
These form part of the 77 diplomatic protests filed against China under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Monday.
Vietnam and Indonesia agreed to delimit their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) on 22 December 2022 after 12 years of negotiations. The agreement provides hope for the strengthening of the region’s commitment to international maritime norms and principles encapsulated in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
TTCT – Dù là đồng minh có hiệp ước của nhau và vừa thắt chặt thêm tình hữu nghị về quân sự, quan hệ Mỹ – Philippines thật ra không phải lúc nào cũng bằng phẳng.
Khi tôi đến thăm Subic Bay năm 1998, khu chế xuất vừa hoạt động và hãng xưởng còn lưa thưa. Đây là khu miễn thuế, ra vào phải qua kiểm soát hải quan, chỗ mua sắm chỉ có vài hàng quán mới mở và loãng khách với một khu phức hợp và ba rạp phim.
Cả khu còn do quân đội Philippines quản lý, hoang vắng với những nhà kho tiền chế và bungalow quân đội Mỹ bỏ lại nằm bắt bụi từ 1992.
Lễ hạ cờ Mỹ và thượng cờ Philippines ở căn cứ Subic Bay ngày 24-11-1992. Ảnh: Wikipedia
China’s coast guard presence in the South China Sea is more robust than ever. An analysis of automatic identification system (AIS) data from commercial provider MarineTraffic shows that the China Coast Guard (CCG) maintained near-daily patrols at key features across the South China Sea in 2022. Together with the ubiquitous presence of its maritime militia, China’s constant coast guard patrols show Beijing’s determination to assert control over the vast maritime zone within its claimed nine-dash line.
China Coast Guard Patrols in the South China Sea 2022
AMTI analyzed AIS data from the year 2022 across the five features most frequented by Chinese patrols: Second Thomas Shoal, Luconia Shoals, Scarborough Shoal, Vanguard Bank, and Thitu Island. Comparison with data from 2020 shows that the number of calendar days that a CCG vessel patrolled near these features increased across the board.
The number of days the CCG patrolled at Vanguard Bank, a major site of Vietnamese oil and gas development that has seen standoffs between Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement in years past, more than doubled, increasing from 142 days in 2020 to 310 days in 2022. Days patrolled at Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines maintains a precarious garrison aboard the BRP Sierra Madre, increased from 232 days to 279; those at Luconia Shoals, near important Malaysian oil and gas operations, from 279 to 316; and at Scarborough Shoal, traditionally fished and administered by the Philippines, from 287 to 344. Data on the reefs surrounding Philippine-held Thitu Island was not collected in previous analyses, but CCG vessels were on site 208 days over the past year. At some features, especially Scarborough Shoal, multiple CCG vessels were present simultaneously. Observed patrols across all five features amounted to 1,703 ship-days in total.
China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
ISBN
978-1-935352-80-8
Publication Date
2023
Publisher
Naval War College Press
City
Newport, Rhode Island
Keywords
China Maritime Studies, China, South China Sea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Expansion
Recommended Citation
Bentley, Scott, “The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea” (2023). CMSI Red Books, Study No. 17.
Nghiên cứu của Tổ chức Sáng kiến minh bạch hàng hải châu Á gần đây cho thấy, chỉ trong năm 2022, Việt Nam đã bồi lấp mở rộng 9 điểm đảo ở quần đảo Trường Sa với tổng diện tích tăng thêm lên đến 170 hecta, gấp gần 4 lần diện tích đóng quân trong cả thập kỷ trước.
Filipino soldiers march in Philippine occupied Thitu island in disputed South China Sea, April 21, 2017. REUTERS/Erik De Castro
MANILA, Dec 22 (Reuters) – The Philippines’ defence ministry on Thursday ordered the military to strengthen its presence in the South China Sea after monitoring “Chinese activities” in disputed waters close to a strategic Philippine-held island.
The ministry did not specify what activities those were and its statement follows a report this week of Chinese construction on four uninhabited features in the disputed Spratly islands, news that Beijing has dismissed as “unfounded”.
A Taiwanese patrol boat fires a ship-to-ship missile during a military drill in 2006. Vietnam slammed Taiwan’s recent live-fire exercises near Taiping Island as “illegal”. Photo: AFP
Vietnam was quick to voice its displeasure this month at Taiwanese military drills near a South China Sea island that both claim, but analysts say the incident speaks more to Taipei’s anxiety for its outlying islands’ continued security than the state of its relations with Hanoi.
Điều gì đẩy các ngư dân đến nỗi tuyệt vọng đằng sau cánh cửa nhà giam của những nước láng giềng? Và tại sao dù biết kết cục cay đắng đó, nhiều người dân vẫn liên tiếp dấn tàu vào khu vực đánh bắt cá trái phép? Và lí do gì khiến nỗ lực gỡ thẻ vàng của Việt Nam vẫn chưa thể thành công?
Đánh bắt thủy hải sản trên vùng biển đảo Phú Quốc. Ảnh: Thuyền trưởng Nguyễn Văn Thành.
Trong căn buồng giam ở Tanjung Pinang, Indonesia, ngư phủ Việt Nam tên Nguyễn Văn Tư, 64 tuổi, một mình vật lộn với những cơn đau nhức ở cẳng chân. Mùa hè hai năm trước, tàu cá ông làm việc bị bắt quả tang đang thả lưới trái phép trong vùng biển Indonesia. Theo luật pháp nước này, những ngư dân làm thuê sẽ không bị phạt tù. Tuy nhiên, Tư đã không đủ tiền mua vé máy bay về nước sau phiên tòa nên bị giữ lại suốt 20 tháng qua.
Hàng trăm ngư dân Việt Nam giống Tư đang đợi chờ ngày về từ các nhà giam kham khổ của Indonesia nhưng có lẽ tình cảnh của Tư bi đát hơn cả. Ông bị tách ra khỏi đồng hương và bị giam riêng biệt do bị nghi mắc bệnh phong.
Thực trạng ngư dân Việt Nam xâm phạm vùng biển nước khác phổ biến đến mức, năm 2017, Việt Nam đã bị Ủy ban châu Âu (EC) rút thẻ vàng cảnh cáo hoạt động khai thác thủy sản. Theo số liệu thống kê của lực lượng Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam, hàng ngàn ngư dân trên hơn 1.000 tàu cá bị lực lượng chức năng các nước bắt giữ trong ba năm 2017-2020.
Lượng tàu cá Việt Nam tăng gần gấp bốn lần trong 20 năm qua. Tàu cá từ biển miền Trung và vùng Đồng bằng sông Cửu Long chiếm lần lượt 50% và 25% tàu cá toàn bộ đất nước. Biểu đồ: Thibi.co
Communist Party of Vietnam leader Nguyen Phu Trong, left, meets with China’s Communist Party leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2015. | Xinhua
HANOI—The Socialist Republic of Vietnam will not be coerced into joining the United States-led effort aimed at isolating China and provoking conflict as part of its Cold War 2.0 foreign policy.
That’s a major message expected to come out of the upcoming visit to China by Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Trong will travel to China to pay an official visit to the newly re-elected Communist Party of China leader Xi Jinping. Trong will be one of the first world leaders to visit China since the closing the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, earlier this month.
AS if communist China was not already doing enough to degrade the rest of the world’s quality of life for its own gain, recent news from South and Central America further reinforces the impression that its rapaciousness knows no bounds. China’s Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly the Philippines, are already familiar with the Red Menace’s greediness when it comes to marine resources, but on the other side of the world, a massive, well-organized, industrial-scale effort to carry out illegal fishing on both sides of Latin America is threatening to wipe out fish stocks for a dozen countries.
This photo taken on 20 August 2022, shows a worker sorting a fresh catch of fish at Sa Ky port on Vietnam’s offshore Ly Son island. Ly Son island, situated north-east of central Vietnam’s Quang Ngai province, is the country’s closest island to the disputed Paracel archipelago in the South China Sea region. (Photo: Nhac Nguyen / AFP)
This article is part of “UNCLOS 40th Anniversary Series – Why UNCLOS Matters” conceptualised by the Blue Security programme. The series, which commemorates the 40th anniversary of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, brings together established and emerging maritime security scholars from Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific to address the pertinence and relevance of UNCLOS. Blue Security brings together Australian and Southeast Asian experts to look at a range of maritime security issues across the region. The series was developed by Dr. Troy Lee-Brown and Dr. Bec Strating. It is published in collaboration with the team at Fulcrum.
UNCLOS’s relevance to Vietnam is significant, but the Convention must be updated if Vietnam and other signatories are to succeed in dealing with contemporary challenges in maritime affairs.
Đọt Chuối Non 